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The time is out of joint; O curs’d spite, 




At first glance, it could seem slightly out of place to dedicate an 
issue of a newly founded journal dedicated to hermeneutics – albeit to 
a critical strand of hermeneutics – to a topic such as migration, forced 
displacements or refugees. Indeed, for the lay reader, is not 
hermeneutics, at least methodologically, primarily concerned with the 
interpretation of texts? Let us concede, still at this first, naïve level, 
that such an approach might indeed look strange. But allow us to wager 
that it might contribute to grasp what is at stake and perhaps even 
change the terms of this fundamental debate. Indeed, when applied to 
an analysis of societies as such, including their political and ethical 
problems, it provides a perspective that is lacking in other approaches. 
First, because a key lesson of hermeneutics is that no existing, 
historically constituted society is a tabula rasa that could, as it were, 
be ruled by a whole set of “invented” ideals, no matter how fair they 
might seem, and that every “revolutionary” attempt to start a political 
order from scratch ultimately ends up in “terror”. Second, because a 
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closely connected lesson is that, in the realm of human action, 
(e)valuation is a constitutive principle. Regardless of the naïve, and 
sometimes even toxic attempts by (neo)positivism, virtually nothing in 
the practical realm (comprising ethical, political and social issues) is 
value-free. That much is asserted by key authors working at the 
intersection between philosophy and economics, such as Hilary Putnam 
(2004) or Amartya Sen (1987), when they put forward their analyses 
of the fact-value entanglement, but the same applies to a 
hermeneutical perspective on the practical realm. 
The combination of the first two hermeneutical lessons allows us, 
on the one hand, to grasp the existence of shared collective traits, such 
as collective identities and their cultural heritage, including their partial 
sedimentation (to which Ricœur would call “ideological” in a 
constitutive sense) but also, on the other hand, to understand how, 
their existence and relevance notwithstanding, these must be 
prevented from becoming completely reified, as if, in virtue of a bad 
analogy pushed too far by an essentialist epistemology, identities came 
to be seen as being completely self-sustained and thus exclusive and 
hostile towards its “others”. On the contrary, a social hermeneutics, 
and namely one that takes stock of Paul Ricœur’s notion of narrative 
identity, understands the inherently fluid and mutable character of any 
collective identity. 
What is thus the advantage of using a hermeneutic method to 
grasp social reality and even attempt to change it? Such a method, 
implicitly or explicitly advocated by, among others, Michael Walzer 
(1987), Charles Taylor (1994), Axel Honneth (2009) and Paul Ricœur 
(1981) in some of their writings (see also Marcelo, 2012), being non-
ideal, is able to uncover the historicity of every social order, including 
its founding beliefs and, while acknowledging their importance in terms 
of the symbolic constitution of the societies and communities it guides, 
is also able to criticize them, precisely in virtue of the fact that is a 
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critical hermeneutics. This means that the conditions of belonging are 
not a priori deemed irrational but also, at the same time, that in order 
for them to be ethically justified, they have to pass the critical test. 
Now, there are many ways in which this criticism can be 
exercised, and that range from the genealogical and immanent critique 
(seeing to what extent given practices or ideals have deviated, or not, 
from their alleged founding meaning) all the way to a transcendent 
criticism that compares given values, that are always historical and 
situated, with other, alternative possibilities. But this much is certain: 
a hermeneutical assessment of social reality is always constitutively 
open to other possibilities of meaning, be it in the form of a Gadamerian 
fusion of horizons, or a Ricœurian productive conflict of interpretations. 
Now, if we draw some of the practical consequences of this 
critical hermeneutic paradigm when applied to social reality, we do 
realize its importance. First, in virtue of the practical perspectivism we 
just alluded to we come to the conclusion that one of its consequences 
is some sort of epistemic humility. Second, and more importantly, this 
humility is a reminder of the incompleteness of every viewpoint and 
thus a call for a shared common understanding in which we are, as it 
were, constitutively open to our others. 
In other words, one of the practical consequences of the critical 
hermeneutical paradigm is that it actively calls for an intersubjective 
grounding of our own selfhood. Therefore, problems such as the ethical 
challenge of welcoming the other (of going from hostility to hospitality, 
as Kearney recalls – see Marcelo, 2017) in the many forms that 
hospitality can take, and to remove the impediments to it – including 
the critique of the exclusionary rhetoric put forward by xenophobic 
political leaders and grounded on a reified and sometimes almost 
solipsistic understanding of monolithic political or cultural identities – 
are intrinsically hermeneutic. 
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And this is why, we believe, it makes sense to tackle the problem 
of migrations from a critical hermeneutical perspective. As Nina Arif 
reminds us in her paper, which we allude to below, we are witnessing 
today the highest recorded numbers of displaced people worldwide. 
The problem of forced migrations is of course not new. People have 
been crossing borders, or attempting to do so, either for strictly 
economic reasons (including escaping famine) or other humanitarian 
disasters, such as armed conflicts, for centuries. However, the sheer 
number of displaced people today, the importance of the Syrian civil 
war, the drama lived by many asylum seekers that have died in the 
Mediterranean sea, and the dreadful reaction felt in many countries of 
the European Union, stoked by xenophobic right-wing populism, as 
Europe seems to place the security of its borders (in what been dubbed 
the “fortress Europe” approach) over and above solidarity and basic 
respect for Human Rights, brought this disgraceful situation to the fore. 
As seen from a Western and, more specifically, European 
perspective, the “refugee crisis” (and by crisis we mean here not so 
much the number of people coming to Europe’s borders, which is 
meagre if compared to other neighbouring countries of the Syrian 
conflict, but rather to Europe’s shameful reaction to it) deepens an 
already-existing European crisis, felt at least since the Euro crisis and 
the way it displayed deep divisions between EU’s member countries, 
and clearly pinpointed the lack of a mobilizing collective project. What 
is more, if we take a look at this from a more global perspective, with 
the rise of anti-immigration sentiments in many places of the world, 
the Brexit problem and the threat of new armed conflicts, it seems we 
might have the ingredients for a possible perfect storm coming. And 
the risk is that, amid all of this, those who will suffer most are already 
those who are worse-off; and these are, of course, forced migrants. 
It was with this complex of problems as a backdrop that we set 
ourselves to organize this special issue on migrations. The issue is 
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mostly made up of philosophical contributions but also open to other, 
more empirical contributions, in order to make sense of the whole 
situation. The first two articles are invited contributions from social 
scientists who make use of philosophy in their work. Their papers allow 
us to take a hold of the situation from other viewpoints, namely the 
social sciences and direct work with migrants, and an analysis of the 
way in which the media wrongfully portrays immigrants, and that 
contributes to normalizing right-wing and xenophobic discourse. 
The opening paper of this issue, Elsa Lechner’s and Letícia 
Renault’s “Migration Experiences and Narrative Identities: viewing 
alterity from biographical research” gives an account of the 
ethnographic work done by the authors with migrants on refugees. The 
authors draw on some key works on hermeneutics, such as those of 
Ricœur, Richard Kearney or Johann Michel, to highlight the very 
important task of giving voice to migrants and refugees’ themselves. 
Lechner and Renault acknowledge both the intersubjective constitution 
of subjectivity, and the way in which identities are constituted, at least 
partially, in a narrative way. Accordingly, they draw on Ricœur’s notion 
of narrative identity to depict how they interacted with migrants in 
“biographical workshops” they conducted in Portugal. Their practice 
and their reflection upon what they do is of the utmost importance in 
this context because forced migrants often lack both voice and 
recognition. Given they are not usually granted the status of equal 
partners in interaction (precisely because they are not part of the 
politeia receiving them, not citizens) they are, more often than not, not 
heard. As such, they come to be depicted by others, such as the media 
or politicians and not always under the most favourable light (to say 
the least). Therefore, one of the tasks that falls upon researchers on 
this problem is precisely to create the spaces and conditions for the 
self-expression of migrants, a process that sheds light on the 
responsibility of researchers themselves, insofar as giving migrants the 
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opportunity to share their own life stories is tantamount to granting 
them at least some basic form of recognition. 
Some striking examples of the biased coverage that some media 
grant to migrants are given in Nina Arif’s “Consenting to Orientalism 
when Covering Migration: How the British Media Dehumanises Migrants 
in the Context of the Syrian Civil War”. Arif shows in what way right-
wing discourses (sometimes populist or far-right xenophobic 
discourses) remain unquestioned even in liberal mainstream media, 
contributing for them to be accepted as “the new normal” and thus 
“manufacturing consent” as Chomsky showed. Arif ties this 
dehumanization of migrants, so widespread in the media, to the Brexit 
vote, fuelled by a misled fear of migrants. She also traces back this 
misrepresentation to the influence of an “Orientalist” view similar to 
Said’s model, figuring the migrants as unwanted and exotic others who 
cannot or should not represent themselves, and who are ultimately 
seen, as is blatantly the case for Muslims, as threatening and violent. 
Providing some examples of this by putting forward a discourse 
analysis of the media coverage of the 2017 Westminster attacks, Nina 
Arif ultimately undertakes another important task for what Michael 
Walzer (1987) called the “connected critic”: to provide people with the 
knowledge allowing them to deconstruct false narratives, which is also, 
of course, of the utmost importance in this time of fake news and 
populist manipulation, mostly bearing on migrants. 
The next paper, written by Alexandra M. Moreira do Carmo and 
titled “A Crise da Existência e o Existencial da Crise. Ser para os outros 
fora do quadro do essencialismo” [The Crisis of Existence and the 
Existential of the Crisis. Being-for-others Outside the Framework of 
Essentialism] takes a step back and reflects upon the overall existential 
significance of the crisis. Alexandra do Carmo traces back the 
contemporary social crises, including the crisis of the Humanities and 
the refugee crisis (that displays a crisis of hospitality through the 
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demonstration of xenophobia), to a more original crisis which, 
according to her, has not yet been overcome. Drawing on Heidegger, 
Alexandra do Carmo puts forward a sharp critique of essentialism, 
understood as abstract idealizations that border on objectivism and, 
according to Husserl, draw science away from the lifeworld. According 
to Alexandra do Carmo, the migration crisis is therefore a sign of a 
deeper contemporary epochal crisis, which is an existential crisis and 
that prevents us from understanding and welcoming change and the 
people who, from the outside, bring it about. In order to grasp it and 
eventually overcome it she analyses, with Maldiney and the neurologist 
Viktor von Weizsäcker, the “existential of the crisis”, namely the fear 
of the stranger, and calls for an openness to the transcendence it 
represents. 
The final four papers all deal with this topic of how to host the 
stranger, ranging from the problem of xenophobia to the challenge of 
going from hostility to hospitality. Eduardo Morello’s and Élsio José 
Corá’s paper “Recém-chegados, Apátridas e Refugiados: Os Modos de 
Aparecer do ‘Estranho’ na Obra de Hannah Arendt” [Newcomers, 
Stateless and Refugees: Ways of Appearing of the ‘Stranger’ in Hannah 
Arendt’s Work] dive deep in Hannah Arendt’s work to probe the many 
ways of seeing the stranger that we can find in her philosophy. They 
detect two major ways of being a stranger, according to Arendt: as an 
inherent condition of all newcomers, and as a symbol of something 
frightening, when we are dealing with stateless persons or refugees. 
Examining the fragility of the latter, they explain how, to Arendt, this 
means they are deprived of their singularity (reduced to an absolute 
difference), their self-narrative and their place in the world, and the 
way in which this can be tied to a suspicion stemming from given 
political communities. They are thus also deprived of a proper welcome, 
unlike the newcomers upon whom hope is bestowed. 
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In turn, Vinicio Busacchi’s “Why Those Who Disregard Foreigners 
Despise Themselves” offers a powerful take on the ethical, 
anthropological and social consequences of being hostile to strangers, 
and namely foreigners. Taking up a Hegelian inspiration, i.e., a striving 
for freedom and justice as emancipatory practices, Busacchi draws a 
close link between the way we treat others and our own self-
development. One of the crises that he pinpoints runs deep: the peril 
of the collapse of democracy. A regime, and in this case democracy, is 
endangered when it ceases to ameliorate itself. Recalling the important, 
and often forgotten, notions of conflict and crisis in Ricœur’s philosophy, 
Busacchi argues that they must be occasions for a renewal of 
democracy. But when, as so often is the case, the exercise of 
democracy is reduced to a mere formality, as happens in so-called 
liberal representative democracies of present times, and the pervasive 
ideology is blatant individualism, the possibility of populism, 
xenophobia and the like can be pushed to the extreme. This, Busacchi 
exemplifies with the way in which Italian media treats migrants in a 
pejorative way – as Nina Arif’s paper does for the British case. And he 
concludes that, given each of us also bears within him or herself an 
inner stranger, to overcome prejudice against foreigners is also to do 
it vis-à-vis one’s inner stranger; conversely, to despise the foreign 
other is also, mutatis mutandis, to despise oneself. 
On the other hand, the final two papers focus on the more 
positive – albeit difficult – (im?)possibility of hospitality. Matheus 
Carvalho’s text, “Alternativas para el Desafio Ético de la Hospitalidad: 
Un diálogo entre el cosmopolitismo, Derrida y Taylor” [Alternatives for 
the Ethical Challenge of Hospitality: A Dialogue between 
Cosmopolitanism, Derrida and Taylor] goes through a comparison 
between cosmopolitanism, hospitality and multiculturalism. Carvalho 
starts with a presentation of cosmopolitanism as entailing a right to 
hospitality insofar as it establishes “citizens of the world”; he pinpoints 
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the origins of the cosmopolitan tradition in ancient Greece and follows 
its thread until Kant and the right to hospitality. Afterwards, Carvalho 
moves to Derrida’s deconstructive notion of hospitality, which is at 
odds with the Kantian emphasis on Law, insofar as the Derridean notion 
is strictly ethical and perhaps irreconcilable with the right to hospitality 
that is supposed to be instantiated in concrete laws. Finally, Matheus 
Carvalho comes to Charles Taylor’s proposal of multiculturalism as a 
concrete political proposal to foster the welcoming of diversity within 
an anthropology that focuses on the dialogic construction of identities 
through processes of mutual recognition. For Carvalho, these three 
different and yet related possibilities can be possible justifications for 
the ethical duty to host strangers such as those that the refugee crisis 
produces. 
Finally, Victor Gonçalves’ paper with the title “Renaturalizar o ser 
humano para renovar o sentido de hospitalidade, entre Derrida e 
Nietzsche” [Renaturalizing the Human Being to renew the Meaning of 
Hospitality, between Derrida and Nietzsche] deepens the analysis of 
Derrida’s proposal of unconditional hospitality, in the context of the 
Levinasian ethical heritage. Taking stock of some of the aporias present 
in Derrida’s take on this issue, Gonçalves proposes to take up 
Nietzsche’s account of a “renaturalization of the human” interpreting it 
as a post-humanist and post-nationalist hospitality. His wager is that 
Nietzsche’s “amoral” stance, resulting in the depiction of a Übermensch 
that is, without doubt, postnational (given that it refuses any 
nationalist, culturalist or identitarian bond) could, in theory, use its 
self-overcoming instinct to found a new society of equal and free 
human beings which, as such, could be capable of a “poetic” or 
“unconditional” hospitality, in the vein of Derrida. In other words: self-
ownership would, perhaps paradoxically, be a condition of possibility of 
a radical hospitality, one which operates without strict rules (i.e., 
without the concrete “laws” of hospitality that Derrida derided). In such 
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a scenario, all would be permanently foreigners, guests and hosts, 
given that national fault lines would no longer matter and this, 
hypothetically, would end with the asymmetry between citizens of a 
given polity and foreigners. Even if only as a thought experiment, one 
cannot overlook the possibility put forward by Victor Gonçalves, of a 
post-Nietzschean way to fulfil Derrida’s (im) possible hospitality. 
Ultimately, we dedicate this issue to the unheard and hope that 
by bringing together a range of different voices, we can help a little to 
amplify the voices of the migrant, the refugee, the asylum seeker, and 
her child and his father. We do this against the almost deafening 
rhetoric of exclusionary debate whether left wing or right wing.  Such 
debate is conducted in ways that remind us of Popper’s definition of 
science: he argued that, whereas it is impossible to incontrovertibly 
prove the truth of a scientific theory, that theory must at least be 
disprovable (Popper, 1959). If a theory is falsifiable it may be hoped 
that it is evidence based and may therefore stand a chance of being 
debatable, even if not useful. If a theory is not falsifiable then it is 
unlikely to have any claim to reality. Popper’s theory is problematic 
and not really hermeneutical but it provides an illuminating analogy 
that helps us to understand why Salvini, Le Pen, Trump and others are 
so seldom challenged: their assertions are so disconnected from reality 
as to be unfalsifiable. This latter is the characteristic of the populist 
demagogues’ assertions: their claims about migrants are so extreme 
and so unreal as to be impossible to falsify. Being thereby unrelated to 
reality they are therefore also very difficult to counter as they have no 
basis in truth, only in emotion and suspicion. These unevidenced 
narratives flourish in a setting such as the national British securitization 
agenda which establishes a backdrop for xenophobia and precludes 
free discussion (Scott-Baumann, 2017a). Such non-dialogic utterances 
on migration must be tackled, and this issue provides a range of 
different sources of evidence, different languages, different linguistic 
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registers and different ethical approaches to encourage educated 
communities to respond to populist assertions.   
As one positive and prescient inspiration we draw upon Paul 
Ricœur as a model for replacing populist discourse with balanced and 
critical hermeneutics. In his 1996 paper “Being a Stranger” (translated 
in Ricœur, 2010) Paul Ricœur argues three points; we should loosen 
our rigid insistence upon the privileges of national citizenship against 
the weak position of the asylum seeker. We should offer hospitality 
better than currently, whether in the form of asylum, tourist rights, 
immigration support or refugee status. However, he asserts that we 
can only achieve these changes once we are comfortable as strong and 
secure citizen–members of our own country.  As so often with Ricœur, 
these words from the late 1990s prove prescient twenty years later.  
With regard to his first point we should be prepared to soften the border 
between the outsider and the insider. Secondly the hospitality we offer 
is often paltry and functions to confine, demean and exclude the 
refugee and the asylum seeker: we should be more generous. 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and the 
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 all individuals have the right to a 
nationality. Ricœur explains how the nation state has created silos that 
each citizen feels safe inside, except that we don’t feel safe. He ends 
his paper Being a Stranger on this challenge: we will only be 
appropriately generous and hospitable to others, in the Kantian sense, 
when we ourselves understand and accept that we truly belong to our 
own nation and that we are secure in our European nationhood and 
citizenship, which is inherently supranational as well as national. For 
Ricœur this means learning at least two languages and reaching out 
beyond our borders. However, as Lorey points out, the neoliberal 
approach exaggerates our precarity through securitisation of borders 
and of identity. This induces and increases our fear of economic ruin 
allegedly caused by the “other” (Lorey, 2012: 64).    
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A crucial aspect of the way we treat foreigners that is not 
considered in by Ricœur in this paper and to which we devote thought 
in this special issue, is the way in which the Western world somehow 
seems to believe it can be immune from the problems suffered by 
outsiders: other people suffer, and we often act as if there is nothing 
we can do about it. Other people become refugees and migrants, and 
we act as if it won’t affect us. Other people are trafficked, but not us. 
None of this is actually true because we know from experience that we 
are capable of pathos and Vinicio Busacchi shows how we weaken our 
own personhood by our refusal to help those in need who are less 
fortunate than ourselves. 
Criminal groups and sub criminal networks all over Europe are 
making a lot of money from migrants: they buy and take over migrants’ 
bodies and their minds for sex and drugs and also for violent crimes 
including terrorism. We are complicit in this because we are allowing 
migrants to be preyed upon as a direct result of our rejection of them 
as viable human beings: many of them are penned like animals in 
holding camps, rendered subhuman by our negligence and prejudice 
and delivered up negligently and unintentionally to crime because no 
other option remains to them (Nadeau, 2018).  
Ricœur, in the paper just cited above, writes as one who has 
steeped himself in government papers and policies, and indeed this 
was the case. In 1996 he sat on the Hessel commission on migrants, 
set up by Rocard, and wrote this piece as a direct result of his 
experiences.  He has written it as a philosopher who is addressing 
policy issues with both philosophical and policy understanding, quoting 
Human Rights legislation and differentiating between different types of 
stranger, as found in French law. He was thus using different 
“registers”. Linguistic “registers” differ depending on the tasks that we 
are asking of language and in “Being a Stranger” Ricœur combines and 
contrasts deep understanding of European thought, philosophical, 
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governmental and statist. This is true of some of the papers in this 
issue, using philosophical and social science registers to clarify 
journalistic ones. 
The register we each use to communicate is of major importance 
and has assumed frightening moral freighting (even more than under 
usual circumstances), as we are putting together this issue of Critical 
Hermeneutics against a barrage of unceasing and vindictive invective 
from groups across Europe loosely known as “populist”. Ricœur 
attributed ethical agency to our use of language and we hope to 
achieve this with this collection of papers; this moral imperative is 
definitely not heeded by the aggressive, non-dialogic tone adopted by 
populist demagogues and discussed by Nina Arif, and this makes it 
even more important for us to bring together the range of different 
registers that can and must be deployed across Europe to resolve the 
migration crisis at both a single state and at a European Union level. 
In this issue of Critical Hermeneutics we have brought together 
different voices, academic, activist and journalistic, in order to explore 
how a world that believes itself to be so civilised, can create such a 
cesspit of degradation and can then also believe that we will not be 
affected by it.  Thus we have invited different registers, and some even 
differ within the same paper, as is the case of Vinicio Busacchi and Nina 
Arif: both use major thinkers to illustrate their positions and also 
discuss the statistics that become the sordid reality for migrants. Both 
writers rectify common misperceptions about the supposed harm done 
by migrants to their host countries.  
Elsa Lechner and Leticia Renault in their research, got close to 
migrants to record their experiences, something which philosophers 
tend not to do. They use biographical research to capture the stories 
of those whose opinions are not asked for and whose voices are not 
heard: the migrants. The absent voice of the migrant is also charted 
by Nina Arif, who shows how the media dehumanise migrant stories by 
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anonymising and rendering subhuman those who dare to seek shelter 
in another land and, as Achille Mbembe elaborates, dare to submit to 
a death sentence meted out by those who should know better. Here 
we return to Ricœur’s allusion to our existential discomfort with 
ourselves: if nations accept the diet of hate dished up to them by media 
and government, they are trapped in unfalsifiable narratives and dwell 
in uncomfortable unrealities in which they half believe that outsiders 
are dangerous. We must continue the debate that this issue has 
initiated, to bring together different evidence bases and different 
registers and different languages, to amplify unheard voices, to 
consider how governments can help and to develop Ricœur’s balanced 
challenges to us so that we can learn about ourselves through learning 
about the other. Ricœur’s work provides us with the frames for 
deploying different registers to illuminate each other (Scott-Baumann 
2017b) 
This is no easy task. It is a challenge and a wager. One that, 
albeit modestly, we hope that this critical hermeneutical issue helps to 
overcome. 
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